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Manipulation in money markets
Abstract
Interest rate derivatives are among the most actively traded financial instruments in the main currency
areas. With values of positions reacting immediately to the underlying index of daily interbank rates,
manipulation has become an increasing challenge for the operational implementation of monetary
policy. To address this issue, we study a microstructure model in which a commercial bank may have
strategic recourse to central bank standing facilities. We characterise an equilibrium in which market
rates will be manipulated with strictly positive probability. Our findings have an immediate bearing on
recent developments in the Sterling and Euro money markets.
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1. Introduction
In the recent past, many central banks have increasingly focused on steering
some short-term money market interest rate in their implementation of the
monetary policy stance. For example, this is the case of the Federal Reserve
in the U.S., the European Central Bank (ECB) in the Euro area, and the
Bank of England in the UK. More broadly, central banks seem to increasingly
attach greater value to stable day-to-day and even intra-day money market
conditions. With this aim, so-called corridor systems have been adopted in
several currency areas, for example, in Australia, Canada, the Euro area, and
New Zealand. More recently, the Bank of England has also adopted such a
system (see Bank of England [5]).1
This paper wishes to contribute to the ongoing discussion on the appro-
priate design of corridor systems2 by showing that manipulation is a potential
issue in such money markets.3 Specifically, a commercial bank might hold
a position that would gain from, say, a rise in policy rates, so that it would
look as an attractive perspective if market rates would increase somewhat.
To create temporarily higher rates, this bank may take up loans from the
1In a corridor system (see, e.g., Woodford [38]), the central bank stands ready to provide
overnight liquidity in unlimited amounts, generally against collateral, at a rate somewhat
above market rates, and stands ready to absorb liquidity overnight in unlimited amounts
at a rate somewhat below market rates. By setting a corridor around the central bank
target or policy rate, the range of variation of overnight interest rates will be bounded,
on a day-to-day basis, by the rates on the standing lending and deposit facilities, allowing
short-term market interest rates to be steered with limited volatility around the desired
level. The Federal Reserve has a semi-corridor system following the introduction of its
primary credit facility, one percentage point above the Fed Funds Target, with zero being
the standard lower bound.
2Furfine [18] shows with a search model that the actual recourse of a lending facility
may be less than suggested by the statistics of individual refinancing costs when the
market attaches a stigma to its use, but also that the availability of a lending facility
might reduce incentives for active participation in the interbank market. Pérez Quirós
and Rodríguez Mendizábal [31] conclude that the introduction of a deposit facility may
lead to a stabilisation of market rates. This is because the deposit facility reduces the costs
of running into a “lock-in” situation, in which reserve requirements are satisfied before the
last day of the reserve maintenance period.
3Manipulation in financial markets has attracted significant academic attention during
the last two decades. Besides the contributions cited below, see for instance Allen and
Gale [1], Allen and Gorton [2], Bagnoli and Lipman [3], Benabou and Laroque [6], Gerard
and Nanda [19], and Vila [37].
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interbank market and deposit the funds with the central bank. Under cer-
tain conditions, this will cause a rise in the market rate, adding value to the
manipulator’s net position.4 We will discuss under which conditions this and
similar strategies are profitable, and which incentive eﬀects are created by
this possibility. We will also discuss some of the means at the disposal of the
central bank to eliminate this kind of behaviour. - - - - - -
Figure
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In the Euro area, variations of this type of manipulative strategy may
have occurred on at least two occasions since the start of Stage Three of the
Economic and Monetary Union in January 1999.
Manipulation episode at the end of the maintenance period5 24
May — 23 June 2000 In this maintenance period, the ECB raised key pol-
icy rates from 3.75% to 4.25% (cf. Figure 1). Ahead of the decision, market
participants were speculating on the timing of the policy change, and also on
the likely scale (25 basis points vs. 50 basis points). Indeed, second-quarter
turnover in interest rate swaps more than doubled in 2000. Already on the
first day of the maintenance period the money market index EONIA was
at 4.06%, reflecting market expectations. On Monday, June 19, 2000, there
was a EUR 4.999 bn total recourse to the deposit facility. This recourse
occurred before the last main refinancing operation, and consequently did
not aﬀect market rates. However, at the close of trading on the next day,
the allotment day of the last main refinancing operation in the maintenance
period, there was another EUR 11.207 bn total recourse to the deposit fa-
cility. This recourse changed the liquidity conditions ahead of a crucial part
of the maintenance period; thus the EONIA increased immediately. Made
distinctly before the end of the reserve maintenance period, the recourse was
indeed quite unusual. It is not unlikely that an individual commercial bank
had strong incentives to attempt manipulation. The Eurosystem launched
a fine-tuning operation and provided EUR 7.000 bn at overnight maturity
4As a side note, a similar strategy was attempted by screenplay adversary Auric
Goldfinger of Ian Fleming’s James Bond 007, when breaking into Fort Knox to “destroy”
massive gold reserves.
5For explanations of technical terms in the context of the implementation framework
of the Eurosystem, we refer the reader to Section 2.
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on Wednesday, June 21, achieving a temporary relief to market conditions.
However, on the penultimate day there was another large composite recourse
to the deposit facility of a total size comparable to the fine-tuning operation.
The Eurosystem did not perform an additional fine-tuning on the last day
of the maintenance period. Overall the maintenance period ended tight with
a net recourse to the marginal lending facility and EONIA 26 basis points
above the new policy rate.
Manipulation episode at the end of the maintenance period 24
April — 23 May 2003 At the start of this maintenance period the EO-
NIA index was at 2.55%, and the minimum bid rate at the main refinancing
operation was 2.50% (cf. Figure 2). During the maintenance period, expec- - - - - - -
Figure
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- - - - - -
tations were formed about a policy rate cut by the ECB in the subsequent
period. The ECB indeed lowered key policy rates by 50 basis points on 6 June
2003. There was an unusually strong activity in the swap market during May
2003. Then, on the allotment day of the last main refinancing operation in
the maintenance period, Tuesday, 20 May, there were several (non-strategic)
recourses to the deposit facility adding to a total of EUR 1.462 bn. Even
though this is not a large total recourse it seems that it had an impact on
liquidity conditions because the EONIA was 23 bp above the minimum bid
rate on the next day. The movement of the market may have triggered the
response that followed. On the next day, there was an active request by an
individual market participant for lending from the Eurosystem of EUR 9.0
bn. This recourse apparently changed or even reversed liquidity conditions
after the last main refinancing operation in the maintenance period. Thus
the EONIA decreased immediately. On the following Thursday, there was
another recourse to the lending facility of EUR 1.8 bn by the same market
participant. Again, the timing of the recourses was unusual. Apparently,
there had been an attempt to imitate the manipulation strategy employed
in 2000, now in the context of expectations of decreasing policy rates. The
ECB launched a liquidity-absorbing fine-tuning operation on Friday, the last
day of the maintenance period, drawing EUR 3.850 bn from the market.
Overall the maintenance period ended slightly loose with a net recourse to
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the deposit facility and EONIA 29 bp below the policy rate.
For a central bank, manipulation is undesirable mainly for two reasons.
First, from an operational perspective, manipulation has the potential to
add volatility to the overnight rate, and to complicate the liquidity manage-
ment of both commercial banks and the central bank. Second, manipulation
may aﬀect the market’s confidence in a smooth implementation of monetary
policy, which may have an impact on longer-term refinancing conditions and
therefore on the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy.
To address this issue, we consider a model in which a strategic trader
with private information may trade in a swap market first and may then
manipulate the market rate. The potential manipulator faces a trade-oﬀ be-
tween the costs of taking control of the market rates and the additional value
for her derivatives position. It turns out that the trade-oﬀ will sometimes,
but not always, induce the trader to leverage her derivatives position, and to
subsequently manipulate the money market. With several informed traders,
a public good problem reduces individual incentives for manipulation, yet
does not eliminate the problem. We then discuss policy measures such as
fine-tuning and the narrowing of the corridor set by the standing facilities.
The discussion covers both elements of the new operational design by the
Bank of England and recent experiences of the Eurosystem.
Technically, our analysis follows the microstructure literature on informed
trade that is associated with the seminal work of A. Kyle [23]. In this litera-
ture, an individual trader with private information may cause a price eﬀect
because the market extracts the information contained in the aggregate order
flow. In an important contribution to this literature, Kumar and Seppi [22]
(henceforth K&S) have studied manipulation in futures markets with cash
settlement. The present paper adapts the assumptions underlying the K&S
model to reflect the institutional backdrop of a corridor system. The main
adaptation concerns the way in which prices are moved in the market for the
underlying. In K&S, there is asymmetric information in the spot market.
Because market participants may mistake uninformed trading for informed
trading, the order flow created by the uninformed manipulator moves the
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price of the underlying asset. In contrast, there is no informed spot trading
in our model. Indeed, while we do not deny the existence of private informa-
tion in the money market, the evidence discussed above suggests that private
information was not necessarily the central element in its mechanics. In our
model, it is assumed that the manipulator gains temporary control of the
market rate by using the standing facilities.6
The diﬀerence in the way in which prices are moved in the market for
the underlying asset causes a qualitative change in the predictions of the
analysis. In our model, a recourse to one of the standing facilities incurs an
immediate loss in net interest earnings equivalent to the diﬀerence between
the corridor rate and the current market rate. To cause the market rate to
change marginally, this spread of typically more than 100 basis points has to
be paid on the absolute amount of the recourse, which may be unprofitable.
Indeed, the strategy does not pay oﬀ unless the involved positions exceed
a certain size. This is why in our set-up, the probability and the extent
of equilibrium manipulation depends on the design of the corridor system,
which enables us to discuss alternatives for policy makers within our formal
framework.7
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides some
background on the Euro money market. This section can be skipped by
those that are already acquainted with the institutional details. Section 3
sets up the basic model. In Section 4, we study the decision problem of the
informed trader. Section 5 analyses the strategic game between manipulator
and market makers. In Section 6, we consider welfare consequences, policy
options, and the extension to several manipulators. Section 7 concludes. All
proofs can be found in the Appendix.8
6In the past, market rates have also reacted to insuﬃcient demand in central bank
operations. It is not clear, however, that these so-called underbidding episodes have been
deliberate attempts of manipulation (cf. Ewerhart [15] and Nyborg, Bindseil, and Strebu-
laev [27]).
7Another diﬀerence is that in K&S, the manipulator’s order in the futures market does
not convey any information. In our model, the private information of the manipulator
causes the swap rate to exhibit a reaction to the order flow, and implies an endogenously
finite market order.
8Note that strategic recourses, while similar in nature, diﬀer from short squeezes (cf.
Nyborg and Strebulaev [28, 29]). In contrast to a short squeeze, a strategic recourse does
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2. Institutional background on the Euro money market
When a customer of a commercial bank A requests a transfer of money
into another party’s account at another commercial bank B, then by purely
mechanical consideration, bank A’s holdings of central bank money will di-
minish, and bank B’s holdings will increase. This and similar types of trans-
actions may, when accumulating over the business day, re-allocate significant
amounts of liquidity between individual credit institutions, which is a motive
for them to trade secured and unsecured short-term credit in the Euro money
market.
A central bank that has chosen to implement monetary policy by steering
short-term interest rates may do so by seeking control of aggregate liquidity
conditions in the money market and by using additional instruments to sta-
bilise interest rates further. This is the approach favoured by many modern
central banks (cf. Bindseil [8] or Borio [9]). In the case of the Eurosystem,
the control of liquidity conditions is attained by the combination of open
market operations, standing facilities, and reserve requirements.
Through its open market operations, the ECB provides the necessary re-
financing to the banking system. The bulk of interbank liquidity in the Euro
area is oﬀered in the weekly main refinancing operations (MROs), which
are open to all eligible counterparties of the Eurosystem. The maturity of
these operations used to be two weeks until March 2004, and has been one
week since then. As a rule, funds extended through main refinancing oper-
ations are allotted on Tuesdays, with settlement on the following Wednes-
day. Other operations include the monthly longer-term refinancing opera-
tions (LTROs) with a maturity of three months, and so-called fine-tuning
operations (FTOs). The latter ones can be used in a very flexible way, yet
at the cost of addressing only a subpopulation of all eligible counterparties.
The Eurosystem’s standing facilities, i.e., the marginal lending facility
and the deposit facility, constitute the interest rate corridor in the Euro
area. There is no administrative procedure. That is, a recourse to either the
not presuppose a temporary monopoly situation. Strategic recourses are also not directly
related to bidding behaviour in central bank operations.
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marginal lending facility or the deposit facility can be requested by any eli-
gible counterparty to the Eurosystem, where intraday debit positions on the
counterparty’s settlement account with the national central bank are auto-
matically considered as a request for recourse to the lending facility. The use
of the facilities occurs after the close of the market (at 6:30 p.m.). By 9:15
a.m. on the subsequent trading day, the market is informed through Reuters
page ECB40 about the aggregate recourses to each of the two standing fa-
cilities. Significant recourses are typically observed only on the last one or
two days of the maintenance period, when demand and supply in the money
market become increasingly inelastic.
Reserve requirements for credit institutions are expressed in terms of
an average balance to be held over a so-called reserve maintenance period
(usually about a month) on the counterparty’s settlement account. Non-
compliance with minimum reserve obligations implies sanctions. In contrast
to the U.S., required reserves are remunerated in the Euro area at a rate
close to funding costs.
The combination of the above instruments makes market conditions in
the Euro money market usually a very stable signal of the current monetary
stance. Nevertheless, both the average level and the volatility of market rates
may vary over time. Especially after the last main refinancing operation in
the maintenance period, market rates may diﬀer visibly from the mid of the
corridor. Deviations of the EONIA from the mid of the interest rate corridor
occur in response to liquidity flows, so-called autonomous factors, which are
beyond the direct control of the central bank’s liquidity management, and
which aﬀect the aggregate liquidity position of the banking system. These
factors include treasury accounts with some national banks, banknotes that
are paid out or collected at counters of commercial banks, and changes to
consolidated net foreign assets held by the Eurosystem. Movements of the
market rates occur also at certain calendar dates such as the end of the quar-
ter and the end of the year, when commercial banks manage their balance
sheets more carefully, and in connection with events that are perceived by
the market to have a potential eﬀect on financial stability. Further devia-
tions of the market index from the mid of the corridor have been observed
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occasionally.
The derivates market allows to either hedge the risks of a change in
short-term interest rates, or to speculate on them. Among the most actively
traded instruments in this market is the overnight interest rate swap (OIS)
of various maturities, ranging from one week to two years. For instance, an
institutional investor might speculate on the timing of an expected increase
in policy rates using a swap contract with a maturity of one month. In
contrast, a commercial bank that wishes to freeze refinancing conditions in
the interbank market until the next main refinancing operation may prefer
a swap with a maturity of only one week. In terms of payments streams,
the OIS is an instrument which exchanges a fixed interest rate against an
index of daily interbank rates (almost always EONIA). The OIS diﬀers from
the plain vanilla interest rate swap (cf., e.g., Bicksler and Chen [7]) which is
used for longer maturities and with reference to the Euribor. Also, for plain
vanilla interest rate swaps, the floating rate is determined at one settlement
date and paid at the next. In contrast, the floating rate leg of an OIS is
determined and paid at maturity. Overnight interest rate swaps have been
known in the U.S. for quite some time as call money swaps.
For many market participants, it is much easier to realise a short-term in-
terest rate position with swaps than with transactions in the deposit market
(see, e.g., Pelham [30], or Elliott [11]). The swap is the more liquid instru-
ment, and involves less credit risk. As a consequence, the swap curve has
emerged as one of the main benchmark yield curves for the Euro area. In
June 2005, Euribor FBE (the European Banking Federation) and Euribor
ACI (the Financial Markets Association) launched the EONIA Swap Index,
which is published over Telerate for maturities ranging from 1 week to 12
months. There has been a continued strong expansion of the EONIA swap
market over the last few years.
The OIS market is a highly competitive, high volume OTC market, with
dominant players featuring in the main European financial centres. The mar-
ket organisation is highly concentrated, with a handful of dealers accounting
for about half of the trading activity. Among the most active dealers are
commercial banks that are headquartered in the Euro area. Dealers contract
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both with other dealers and with customers. The range of institutions par-
ticipating in the OIS market as customers is very broad, originating from
both the financial sector (credit institutions, insurance companies, pension
funds, hedge funds, money market funds, etc.) and the non-financial sec-
tor (European governments). Leveraged funds are especially active in this
market. For further details on the Euro money market and the overnight
swap market, the reader is referred to descriptive studies by Remolona and
Wooldridge [33], Santillán, Bayle, and Thygesen [34], Hartmann, Manna, and
Manzaranes [20], and to the ECB’s annual Euro money market study [13].
3. Formal set-up
Our market environment is an adapted version of Kumar and Seppi [22], as
discussed in the Introduction. We envisage a developed money market with
reserve requirements and averaging provision, embedded into a symmetric
corridor system. Our analysis will focus on the last two days of the reserve
maintenance period, when the regular (weekly) refinancing operations by the
central bank have already established “neutral” conditions, and the market
is essentially left on its own. Following the conventional terminology used in
fixed income and money markets, prices are replaced by interest rates. The
set-up is then as follows. - - - - - -
Figure
3
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- - - - - -
Three assets are traded in the money market: first, a riskless bond (“net
interest”), which serves as a numeraire; second, a standardised overnight
deposit contract (“liquidity”) with endogenous interest rate r; and third,
an overnight interest rate swap (“OIS”) on the deposit contract, traded at
the swap rate r∗. Sign conventions for fixed-for-floating swaps tend to be
ambiguous and depend on whether the hedging or the speculation motive is
stressed. Throughout the present paper, we will adhere to the convention
that the receive-floating party is long the swap, so that the position in her
portfolio obtains a positive sign. This convention has the consequence that
increasing market rates are desirable for the holder of a long position in the
OIS, and conversely for a short position.
The sequence of events is summarised in Figure 3. A swap market on
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date 1, organised in the late morning of the trading day, is followed by a spot
market for the underlying deposit contract on date 2, organised at a similar
time of the day. A liquidity shock hits the market shortly before the end of
date 2. Following the shock, but still before the close of the market at the
end of date 2, there is last-minute trading in the deposit contract. All net
interests on deposit and swap contracts are paid at date 3.
Alltogether five types of traders participate in these markets: first, a
risk-neutral informed trader (a commercial bank attempting manipulation);
then, risk-neutral discretionary traders in the deposit markets (nonspecialised
commercial banks); third, nondiscretionary traders in the swap market that
trade for exogenous reasons (non-financial firms); and finally, two groups of
competitive risk-neutral market makers in the deposit market (money market
specialists) and in the swap market (swap dealers). Commercial banks are
subject to an individual minimum reserve requirement that must be fulfilled
by the end of date 2. They have also access to the central bank’s standing
facilities at any date before date 3.9
The game between the traders has then the following structure. The in-
formed trader obtains an initial endowment X0 in the swap before date 1.
This initial position may be the result of OTC trading with non-bank cus-
tomers, and is assumed to be private information.10 At date 1, the informed
trader submits a market order X1 to the swap dealers, where X1 > 0 when
paying the fixed rate. The non-financial firms submit an independent order
volume Y with mean EY [Y ] = 0. The dealers observe the aggregate order
flow Z = X1+Y in the swap market. Moreover, dealers will be understood to
9Having commercial banks serving as market makers in the model would complicate
the analysis without changing the conclusions. In a nutshell, the problem would be that
an individual swap dealer, when receiving a too large share of the total market order,
may have an incentive to counteract the strategic recourse of the informed trader. This
incentive is absent from the model if the swap dealers are not too few, or if there is not
too much trading of swaps by non-financial firms at date 2.
10In practice, the initial position X0 may not necessarily be stochastic. A commercial
bank could actively manage short-term interest rate positions vis-à-vis non-bank customers
in a specific way, e.g., by asking customers to swap variable interest income into fixed
interest income. That would make the initial position endogenous. However, a commercial
bank may be able to do this once, but not several times, because it would openly steel
profits from its customers.
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be informed about whether the informed trader submits a non-zero market
order.11 Formally, let b = 1 if X1 6= 0, and b = 0 otherwise, and assume
that swap dealers observe b. The swap dealers are then willing to clear the
swap market at the competitive rate r∗(Z, b). Since only the case b = 1 is
interesting, we will henceforth drop the second argument and write simply
r∗(Z) for r∗(Z, 1).
With the close of the market at the end of date 1, the informed trader
may have recourse S to the standing central bank facilities, where S > 0
stands for a recourse to the lending facility, and S < 0 for a recourse to
the deposit facility. On date 2, the recourse S becomes public information.
Commercial banks may then submit market orders for the deposit contract.
As the order flow is not informative, the market specialists fix the interest
rate on the deposit contract at date 2 to some value r(S) that depends only
on S.
Shortly before the end of trading on date 2, a liquidity shock V may aﬀect
the aggregate liquidity position of the banking system, where V > 0 stands
for an absorption of liquidity. The dispersion of the shock over commercial
banks does not matter under symmetric information and is therefore not
explicitly modelled. The liquidity shock is assumed to be distributed inde-
pendently fromX0 and Y . Given that the central bank implements monetary
policy in a neutral way, the median of the distribution of V will be zero. It is
assumed that the distribution of V is given by a density φV (.) that is weakly
increasing for S < 0 and weakly decreasing for S > 0.
All commercial banks try to cover their positions at the end of date 2,
so that the price in the last-minute trading equals either the central bank’s
lending rate rL (when S − V < 0) or the central bank’s deposit rate rD
(when S−V > 0), where 0 < rD < rL. Under these conditions, the liquidity
eﬀect resulting from a recourse is determined exclusively by the change in
the relative probabilities of a tight or a loose end of the maintenance period.
Thus, the market for the overnight contract appears in the reduced form
which has become standard in the literature since Poole [32].
11Non-anonymity significantly simplifies the analysis without aﬀecting our main results.
For a model without this assumption, the reader is referred to our working paper [17].
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Poole’s Lemma. The market rate at date 2 for the deposit contract after a
net recourse of S is given by a weakly decreasing function
r(S) = ΦV (S)rD + (1−ΦV (S))rL, (1)
where ΦV (S) =pr{V ≤ S} denotes the cumulative distribution function of the
liquidity shock V . In particular, for S = 0, the market rate r(0) corresponds
to the midpoint r0 = (rD + rL)/2 of the corridor.
Indeed, after the last main refinancing operation, money market rates in
the Euro area are generally expected to move in response to the release of
public information about flows of liquidity that aﬀect the aggregate liquidity
position of the banking system, e.g., when a recourse to a standing facility
of the central bank occurs.12 As we will discuss now, it is this liquidity
eﬀect that opens the door for the profitable abuse of the credit and deposit
facilities.
4. Sporadic manipulation
A market participant who intends to take temporary control of the market
rate will be aware of the costs and benefits of such a strategy. There are costs
because the use of standing facilities is bound to interest rate levels which
almost always diﬀer significantly from market conditions. There are benefits
because short-term interest rate positions may gain in value. In this section,
we analyse under which conditions a strategic recourse is profitable.
Formally, net interest income π for the informed trader is the sum of
three components, as suggested by equation (2) below. First, there is the
net return on the initial position X0 in the swap. The initial position is
valued with the interest rate r(S) realised at date 2, while funding costs for
this position are already sunk at date 1, and can be normalised to r0. Next,
there is the net return on the market order X1. Here as well, the position
is valued using the interest rate r(S) realised at date 2. Funding costs are
12The corresponding empirical evidence for the U.S. is mixed. See in particular Hamilton
[21], Thornton [35], and Carpenter and Demiralp [10].
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given by the swap rate at date 1, which will be denoted by r∗. The third
income component is the net interest paid for the strategic recourse S to the
standing facilities. This component is generally negative. E.g., a recourse
to the credit facility costs rL, but yields only r(S) ≤ rL. Summing up, the
informed trader obtains a net interest income
π(X0,X1, S) = X0(r(S)− r0) +X1(r(S)− r∗) + S(r(S)− rL/D(S)), (2)
where we write
rL/D(S) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
rL if S > 0
r0 if S = 0
rD if S < 0
for the interest rate that the informed trader either pays for having recourse
to the marginal lending facility or receives for depositing money with the
central bank. The terms r0 and r∗ correspond to the fixed leg of the swap
positions X0 and X1, respectively. The variable interest rate r(S) is received
or paid on all three positions.
Controlling the market rate. The starting point for the analysis is to
note that a strategic recourse to one of the standing facilities is not always
optimal. Denote by X = X0+X1 the total swap position. For concreteness,
assume a long position, i.e., X > 0. The reader will note that it is never
optimal in this situation to have recourse to the marginal lending facility.
Indeed, to increase the value of the position, the market rate must go up and
liquidity must become scarcer, so the informed trader will have recourse to
the deposit facility (S < 0). We diﬀerentiate the informed trader’s objective
function (2) with respect to S. Then the necessary first-order condition - - - - - -
Figure
4
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here
- - - - - -
governing the informed trader’s decision about S at date 1 becomes
−r0(S)(X0 +X1 + S) = r(S)− rD. (3)
As captured by the left-hand side of equation (3), the marginal benefit of
manipulating the interest rate upwards is the increase in the market value of
the aggregate net position X + S. The marginal cost, on the other hand, is
the interest rate diﬀerential between a deposit in the market and a deposit
with the central bank. The resulting trade-oﬀ may be one-sided, however.
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Specifically, it turns out that if X is small enough in absolute terms, then the
benefit will always be smaller than the cost, so that manipulation does not
pay oﬀ. A similar consideration can be made for the case of a negative X.
Thus, as depicted in Figure 4, the optimal recourse to the standing facilities,
drawn as a function of the informed trader’s position in short-term interest
rate instruments, is zero for small absolute values of X.
Proposition 1. The optimal strategic use of standing facilities S∗(X) at the
end of date 1 involves no recourse for |X| ≤ ∆/ρ, where ∆ = rL − r0 is the
half-width of the corridor, and ρ = |r0(0)| is the liquidity eﬀect. Moreover,
when |X| > ∆/ρ, then S∗(X) 6= 0, and X and S∗(X) are of opposite sign.
Thus, only a market participant with a suﬃciently large exposure has an
incentive to attempt manipulation. Such a trader may have built up a suf-
ficiently large long position in the swap market (X > ∆/ρ) and will have
recourse to the deposit facility (S < 0) to cause prices to rise. In this case, it
cannot be optimal to use the lending facility, i.e., to manipulate the market
rate downwards, because the alternative choice S = 0 avoids the non-trivial
costs of the lending facility, and does not lower the value of the swap posi-
tion. In the other scenario, a trader with a suﬃciently large short position
(X < −∆/ρ) will have recourse to the marginal lending facility (S > 0), and
will profit from the softening of the market.
Which size of position makes manipulation profitable? We have estimated
elsewhere (see Ewerhart, Cassola, Ejerskov, and Valla [16]) that for the Euro
area under the system in use before March 2004, ρ ≈ 0.09%/bn EUR. The
figure captures the response to a publicly observed, one-day liquidity shock
of 1 bn EUR, which occurs immediately after the last main refinancing oper-
ation, and which is not corrected for by later fine-tuning. With this estimate,
we can perform the following crude calibration. The corridor half-width be-
ing ∆ = 1%, Proposition 1 predicts that manipulation is the consequence of
profit maximisation for positions with a notional of at least
∆
ρ
≈ 1%
0.09 %/bn EUR
= EUR 11.1 bn.
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The reader will note that this figure does not take account of expectations
about potential central bank interventions after an attempted manipulation
(these are diﬃcult to quantify), and may therefore understate the actual
threshold.
5. Trading in the swap market
Once a market participant considers manipulation as a profitable strategy,
she will seek to improve the eﬀectiveness of this strategy by leveraging her
initial position in short-term interest-rate instruments. In the model, this
possibility is reflected by the informed trader’s endogenous choice of the swap
market order X1. As mentioned in Section 2, an additional position taking
could also be accomplished by satisfying reserve requirements unevenly over
time. Which of these and possible other instruments is used by the individual
treasurer is ultimately an empirical question. To keep the model tractable,
we will focus in the sequel on the case of leverage using the swap market.
While position taking is essentially costless in the liquid OIS market,
it cannot be accomplished at zero cost. In an equilibrium with rational
expectations, swap dealers will anticipate the possibility of manipulation and
will extract the information contained in the order flow. E.g., a large positive
market orderX1 = X∗1(X0), unless compensated by nondiscretionary trading,
indicates to the dealers that the informed trader has already a relatively large
initial long position X0, making a recourse to the deposit facility more likely.
Competition between swap dealers will force those dealers to set the swap
rate close to market expectations about the deposit rate at date 2. More
precisely, conditional on the total order volume Z = X∗1(X0) + Y , the swap
rate will be set to
r∗(Z) = EX0,Y [r(S
∗(X0 +X1)|Z]. (4)
Here, the swap rate r∗(Z) will typically be increasing in Z. Thus, as a
consequence of the dealers’ rational anticipation, creating significant leverage
may be costly for the informed trader.
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But when large trades can aﬀect market expectations, it will be easier
for the informed trader to leverage the existing position than to hedge it.
Indeed, as our next result shows, neither hedging nor a change of the market
side can be optimal in a symmetric market environment.
Proposition 2. Assume that X0, Y , and V are symmetrically distributed
with mean zero, and that EY [r∗(X1 + Y )] is increasing in X1. Then the
informed trader’s optimal market order satisfies X∗1(X0) ≥ 0 for X0 > 0 and
X∗1(X0) ≤ 0 for X0 < 0.
While the informed trader will never reduce her initial exposure in a sym-
metric market environment, we will see below that under general conditions,
and in intuitive extension of Proposition 1, she may choose to let the posi-
tion unchanged. More precisely, if the initial position X0 is relatively small
in absolute value, then the informed trader does not participate in the swap
market, and does not manipulate the deposit rate. The intuitive reason
for this finding is that the informed trader needs a sizable total position
X = X0 + X1 to make a strategic recourse ex post optimal. But if X0 is
small in absolute terms, a deal X1 of the required size would reveal too much
information, which would make the whole plan unprofitable.
These considerations are reflected in our description of the equilibrium,
which will be provided below. By an equilibrium, we mean functions for the
market order X∗1 (.) and for the strategic recourse S∗(.), and a pricing rule
r∗(.) such that (i) for any X0 in the support of the initial distribution, the
informed trader maximises expected net income from interestEY [π] by choice
of X1 = X∗1(X0) and S = S∗(X0 +X1), and (ii) for any Z = X1 + Y in the
support of the equilibrium distribution, dealers set the swap rate r∗ = r∗(Z)
competitively as captured by (4).13
The “sporadic” nature of manipulation, while valid much more generally,
precludes the possibility of a tractable equilibrium with normally distributed
random parameters. The point to note is that, as manipulation occurs only
13In principle, the swap dealers should form expectations also oﬀ the equilibrium distri-
bution of net aggregate orders. However, in our set-up, these expectations can be assumed
to extrapolate the linear price eﬀect in the swap market, making a deviation by the in-
formed trader unattractive.
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for suﬃciently large initial positions, the conditional distribution of market
orders is determined by the tails of the distribution of the initial position.
Tail distributions, however, of normal distributions are not normal. Thus,
despite the theoretical desirability of the normal distribution that has been
pointed out by Nöldeke and Tröger [25, 26] and Bagnoli, Viswanathan, and
Holden [4], it is preferable in our situation to consider a set-up with uniform
distributions, just because the tail distribution of a uniform distribution is
again uniform. We will assume therefore in the sequel that the random
variables X0, Y , and V are uniformly distributed on intervals [−δX , δX ],
[−δY , δY ], and IV = [−δV , δV ], respectively, where δX , δY , δV > 0.
In the uniform set-up, boundary conditions must be considered explicitly.
Two restrictions on the parameter values have to be imposed. First, we
assume that the liquidity shock is suﬃciently dispersed, as captured by
δV >
δX + δY
3
. (5)
This restriction will ensure that the manipulated market rate does not reach
the boundary of the corridor, which is a useful simplification. Further, to
focus on the interesting case of manipulation, we will assume that the initial
position of the informed trader is suﬃciently large with positive probability,
i.e.,
δX > δV . (6)
When these two conditions are satisfied, we find an explicit equilibrium with
the following characteristics:
Proposition 3. Under conditions (6) and (5), there is an equilibrium in the
manipulation game. For |X0| < δV , there is no manipulation, i.e., X∗1 (X0) =
S∗(X0) = 0. For |X0| ≥ δV , however, the informed trader will leverage her
position and subsequently manipulate the deposit rate.
The proposition suggests that those commercial banks that are the most
active traders of interest rate derivatives with non-bank customers, i.e., those
with a large δX , should be among the most likely to manipulate the deposit
market. In practice, the decision to manipulate by a commercial bank will
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depend also on other factors, including (i) the overall trading and collateral
capacities of the bank, (ii) the internal allocation of the bank’s risk budget
between markets, and (iii) its general readiness to take strategic measures in
the search of profit opportunities, including the involved daringness vis-à-vis
the monetary authority and potentially other regulatory institutions. For
these reasons, we would expect that even in a large currency area, only few
commercial banks may be prepared for manipulative actions such as those
described in this paper. Depending on the central bank’s stance on this issue,
it may also be diﬃcult for an individual institution to repeat an unwanted
manipulative strategy. Still, a central bank will have to formulate a credible
response to such strategies.
6. Welfare consequences, policy measures, and further discussion
6.1 Social cost of manipulation
As mentioned in the Introduction, manipulation is not welcomed by a cen-
tral bank because it might negatively aﬀect the reputation of the monetary
authority and also because it may add volatility to money market conditions.
We will use three diﬀerent measures for the welfare loss: first, the probability
of manipulation pr{S∗ 6= 0}; second, the expected extent of manipulation
E[|S∗| |S∗ 6= 0], conditional on a strategic recourse; and finally, the volatil-
ity of the market rate at date 2, measured by the unconditional standard
deviation
σM =
p
E[(r(S)− r0)2].
The first two measures are related to central bank reputation, while the
volatility measure captures the objective of smooth implementation.
6.2 Preventing manipulation
What mechanisms could prevent the need of money markets to accommodate
volatility caused by strategic recourses?
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The width of the corridor. In the early discussion of the problem (cf.
Vergara [36]), it had been suggested that a wider interest rate corridor should
eﬀectively defuse the risk of manipulation. Indeed, it is not implausible to
conjecture that a larger average spread between the EONIA and the re-
spective facility rate should increase the cost of aﬀecting the market rate
suﬃciently to make manipulation unattractive. However, as our next re-
sult shows, this intuition is incorrect. Formally, let ∆0 > ∆ denote the
enlarged half-width of the interest rate corridor. We increase the lending
rate rL = r0 +∆ to r0 +∆0, and lower the deposit rate from rD = r0 −∆
to r0−∆0. These changes are then implemented consistently over the whole
two-day maintenance period.
Proposition 4. Widening or narrowing the interest rate corridor has no
eﬀect either on the probability or on the extent of manipulation.
To see why the proposition holds in the case considered in Proposition 3,
recall that by Poole’s Lemma, the size of the liquidity eﬀect is proportional
to the width of the corridor, i.e.,
ρ = |r0(0)| = |Φ0V (0)|(rL − rD) = 2|Φ0V (0)|∆. (7)
Using (7) in the equilibrium conditions, one can verify that ∆ cancels out in
all expressions, so that both the probability and the extent of manipulation
remain unaﬀected by the size of the width.
Proposition 4 is much more general and does not depend on distribu-
tional assumptions. Intuitively, the interest rate corridor has two roles as an
instrument in the implementation of monetary policy. On the one hand, the
standing facilities impose an eﬀective boundary to money market conditions.
On the other, however, the width of the corridor is a linear scaling factor for
the size of the liquidity eﬀect. Once this double role of the corridor is taken
into account, the above result should be ultimately straightforward: While
a wider corridor makes strategic recourses more costly for the commercial
bank, the gains are scaled up as well.
Of course, the volatility caused by manipulation could be lowered by
having a tighter corridor. However, in practice, a corridor that is too tight
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would create incentives for exclusive trading with the central bank, and would
consequently dry out the interbank market. This would constitute a problem
because considerations of credit risk imply a certain dispersion of the interest
rates that are applied to bilateral transactions in the money market. The
optimal size of the corridor should reflect the central bank’s trade-oﬀ between
smoothing implementation and setting prudential incentives.
Fine-tuning. The model can be extended in a straightforward way to in-
corporate the possibility of central bank intervention. Let α0 ∈ [0; 1] denote
the probability that the central bank intends fine-tuning at the end of date
2.14 The parameter values α0 = 0 and α0 = 1 correspond to no intervention
and regular fine-tuning, respectively. In the case of the Eurosystem, the pa-
rameter α0 has traditionally been close to zero. Indeed, before 11 May 2004,
the ECB had generally been quite reluctant to use additional operations to
correct for end-of-period imbalances, apparently because there had been no
good reason for an intervention, and also because some volatility seems to
be desirable to provide incentives for bidding in the main refinancing oper-
ations (cf. ECB [12]). However, following the initial experiences with the
new operational framework, the ECB gradually increased its willingness to
intervene on the last day, with fine-tuning after February 2005 occurring al-
most regularly at the end of the maintenance period. Thus, nowadays, with
quasi-regular fine-tuning at the end of each maintenance period, α0 should
be much closer to one.
Fine-tuning operations may not always lead to the desired result. This
indeed happened in the Euro area when market participants found the con-
dition in a liquidity-draining fine-tuning operation not suﬃciently attractive
to participate (cf. ECB [14]). Formally, we assume a conditional probability
π > 0 that a given fine-tuning operation does not lead to the desired outcome.
The probability of successful fine-tuning is then given by α = α0(1− π). We
14In a more descriptive set-up, the probability of fine-tuning would be correlated with
the size of the liquidity imbalance on the last day of the reserve maintenance period.
In this case, the manipulator may choose a lower S∗ to avoid the fine-tuning. While the
corresponding equilibrium would be intractable, we conjecture that the qualitative features
of our predictions would be essentially unchanged.
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assume that an unsuccessful operation fails completely, while conditional on
a successful fine-tuning operation, the market rate at the end of date 2 is r0.
The market rate after manipulation will then be r(S) with probability 1−α,
and r0 with probability α. In expected terms, a recourse of S in the context
of a central bank reaction captured by α implies a market rate at date 2 of
r(S, α) = αr0 + (1− α)r(S). (8)
In particular, with fine-tuning, the deviation of the market rate from r0 at
date 2 is bounded by (1 − α)∆. Thus, in a sense, fine-tuning attenuates
the liquidity eﬀect more eﬀectively than a more dispersed liquidity shock.
Adapting Proposition 3, we arrive at the following result.
Proposition 5. Assume that the probability π of an operational failure is
smaller than one. Then a higher probability of fine-tuning α0 lowers the
probability and the extent of manipulation, as well as the volatility of money
market conditions.
Thus, deviations of the money market rate caused by strategic recourses
can be eﬀectively reduced by an appropriate and immediate reaction of the
central bank, and should therefore be expected to be a transient phenomenon
in practice. In practice, an immediate reaction is needed, because if the
recourse is not compensated immediately in the morning of the subsequent
day, the market rate could have moved, and a gain for the manipulator would
result.
The BoE design. Our analysis may throw some light on the innovative
design of the standing facilities in the new operational framework of the
Bank of England (see Macgorain [24]). The final design involves having a
corridor half-width of 1 percent, as in the case of the Eurosystem, but having
the corridor narrowed down to 0.25 percent on the final day of the reserve
maintenance period. This design element eﬀectively drives a wedge between
the cost of the strategic recourse on the right-hand side of equation (3),
which remain high, and the benefit from the interest rate movement on the
left-hand side of (3), which is significantly reduced. Formally, for t = 1, 2,
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denote by rLt and rDt the facility rates at date t, and by ∆t = (rDt − rDt )/2
the corridor half-width at date t.
Proposition 6. Narrowing of the corridor only on date 2 by some factor
β = ∆1/∆2 > 1 is equivalent to successful fine-tuning with probability α =
1− 1/β.
The narrowing of the corridor on the last day of the reserve maintenance
period may therefore become a complement or substitute for fine-tuning, for
instance, when the probability π of an operational failure is not negligible.
The Bank of England has combined narrowing of the corridor with a regular
fine-tuning policy and flexible reserve requirements. Preliminary evidence
from the Stirling money market suggests that this combination of policy
measures is indeed quite powerful.15
6.3 Several manipulators
Intuitively, the possibility of profitable manipulation should provoke imita-
tion or climbing on the bandwagon by other major players in the interbank
market. To study this possibility in formal terms, we generalise our model to
the case of N ≥ 2 informed traders i = 1, ..., N . Consider an informed trader
i with an initial position X i0 and a submitted market order X i1. There is an
interaction with the other informed traders at the end of date 1 because the
value of i’s position does not only depend on her own recourse Si, but also
on the aggregate net recourse
S−i =
X
j 6=i
Sj
of the other informed traders. Formally, this interdependence is reflected in
the net income from interest for trader i, which is given by
πi(X i0,X
i
1, S
i, S−i) = X i0(r(S
i + S−i)− r0) +Xi1(r(Si + S−i)− r∗)
+ Si(r(Si + S−i)− rL/D(Si)),
15Information policy does not appear to us as a useful instrument to combat manipu-
lation. While in principle, the central bank could withhold information about recourses,
the manipulator has an incentive to actively disseminate this information. Moreover, the
resulting ambiguity might lead to even more gaming.
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in straightforward generalisation of (2). To keep the model tractable, we
focus on the second stage of the manipulation game. Formally, we will dis-
allow swap trading at date 1, and assume that initial swap positions X i0 are
perfectly correlated.
Proposition 7. There exists an equilibrium in the second stage of the manip-
ulation game with N ≥ 2 informed traders. Similar to the case N = 1, there
is no recourse provided that |X i| ≤ δV . If, however, δV < |Xi| < (2+1/N)δV ,
the informed trader i’s equilibrium recourse Si,∗ is given by
Si,∗ = −sign(X i) |X
i|− δV
N + 1
.
Thus, with N ≥ 2 informed traders, there is a public good problem be-
tween the informed traders because all informed traders will benefit from
an individual trader’s strategic recourse. However, it must be conjectured
that competition among potential manipulators alone will not preclude the
possibility of manipulation.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have pointed out that in money markets that are embedded
in a corridor system, composed of central bank lending and deposit facilities,
there is the potential for manipulative action that abuses these facilities.
Anecdotal evidence for the Euro area suggests that this strategy may be per-
ceived by the market as more than just a theoretical possibility. We have
used a microstructure model to show that manipulation can be profitable
for a commercial bank with suitable ex-ante characteristics. Manipulation
remains a feature of the equilibrium even if dealers in the derivatives mar-
ket form rational expectations about potential manipulation. A widening of
the interest rate corridor over the whole reserve maintenance period is not
helpful. Instead, regular fine-tuning fights manipulation eﬀectively, or alter-
natively narrowing the corridor on the last day of the maintenance period.
Indeed, these measures ensure that the costs of manipulation remain high,
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while the benefits decrease. Our analysis supports the common perception
that the monetary authority has powerful instruments to combat manipu-
lation, but also that further vigilance in these operational matters appears
recommendable.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Poole’s Lemma. The distribution of V having no mass points, the
probability that the maintenance period ends with ample liquidity amounts
to
pr{S − V > 0} = pr{V < S} = pr{V ≤ S} = ΦV (S).
Similarly, the probability that S−V < 0 is given by 1−ΦV (S). This proves
(1). The monotonicity of r(S) follows from
r(S) = rL −ΦV (S)(rL − rD).
As the median of the distribution of V is zero, we have ΦV (0) = 1/2, which
proves the Lemma.¶
Proof of Proposition 1. Assume first that X ≥ 0. Then any S > 0 is
strictly inferior to no recourse, i.e., to S = 0. Thus, S∗(X) ≤ 0. Using (3)
and Poole’s Lemma, we find the necessary first-order condition
X = −S + 1−ΦV (S)
φV (S)
, (9)
where S < 0 and such that φV (S) > 0. It is easy to check that the right-
hand side of equation (9) is strictly decreasing in S < 0, and approaches
∆/ρ for S → 0. Hence, equation (9) has a unique solution S∗(X) < 0
for any X > ∆/ρ. Clearly, this is the global optimum when the support
interval IV of the distribution of V is not bounded from below. Assume now
a finite lower boundary V < 0 of IV . Then clearly, any S < V is inferior to
S = V , so that also in this case, the global optimum is determined by (9).
For 0 ≤ X ≤ ∆/ρ, an interior solution is not feasible. Therefore, S∗(X) = 0
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when IV is unbounded from below. When IV is bounded from below, then
V ≤ −∆/ρ because ΦV (S) is convex for S < 0. But then,
π(X0,X1, V )− π(X0, X1, 0) = X(rL − r0) + V (rL − rD) < 0.
Thus, also when IV is bounded from below, S∗(X) = 0 for 0 ≤ X ≤ ∆/ρ.
The case X < 0 can be treated in an analogous way. Hence the assertion.¶
Proof of Proposition 2. Without loss of generality, assume X0 > 0 (the
other case follows by symmetry). Consider first a change in the market side,
i.e., a market order X1 < 0 such that X0+X1 < 0. We claim that submitting
this market order is suboptimal, even if followed by S = S∗(X0+X1). As an
alternative plan of action, consider bX1 = −2X0 −X1, followed by bS = −S.
Indeed, in this case X0 + bX1 = −(X0 +X1), so that in a symmetric market
environment,
π(X0, bX1, bS)− π(X0,X1, S) (10)
= X1(EY [r∗(X1 + Z)]− r0)| {z }
>0
− bX1(EY [r∗( bX1 + Z)]− r0)| {z }
>0
Clearly, |X1| > | bX1| and consequently also
|EY [r∗(X1 + Z)]− r0| > |EY [r∗( bX1 + Z)]− r0|.
Thus, (10) is positive, proving our claim. Consider now the case of hedging,
i.e., −X0 ≤ X1 < 0. Then X0 + X1 ≥ 0 and therefore S∗(X0 + X1) ≤ 0
by Proposition 1. We claim that a deviation to bX1 = 0 without changing
S = S∗(X0 +X1) is already a better trading strategy. To see why, note that
r(S) ≥ r0 and that r0 > EY [r∗(X1 + Z)]. But then,
π(X0, bX1, bS)− π(X0,X1, S) = −X1(r(S)−EY [r∗(X1 + Z)]) > 0.
Thus, also hedging cannot be optimal.¶
Proof of Proposition 3. This result follows immediately from Lemma A.1
below for α = 0 (i.e., no fine-tuning).¶
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Proof of Proposition 4. Start from an equilibrium in the manipulation
game. Assume first that the half-width of the corridor is scaled up from
∆ > 0 to some ∆0 > 0, where ∆0 < r0. Let γ = ∆0/∆ > 1. Then, by
Poole’s Lemma, the liquidity eﬀect r(S) − r0 is scaled up by the factor γ.
Consider now, as an equilibrium candidate in the model with corridor ∆0, a
competitive swap spread r∗ − r0 that is scaled up by the factor γ. It is then
straightforward to check that the objective function (2) of the manipulator is
multiplied by γ. The optimal strategy of the informed trader concerning the
choice of X1 and S as a function of X0 remains unchanged. Thus, neither the
distribution of aggregate market orders Z arriving at the dealer’s desk, nor
the dealer’s posterior belief on S given his observation of Z is aﬀected. From
equation (4), we get that the scaled down pricing function in the swap market
is indeed competitive. A similar argument can be made for a narrowing of
the corridor. Hence the assertion.¶
Proof of Proposition 5. This result follows immediately from Lemma A.1
below.¶
Lemma A.1. For α < 1, let bδV = δV /(1− α). Assume
δX > bδV and δX + δY < 2δV + bδV . (11)
Then the following is an equilibrium in the manipulation game with fine-
tuning. For |X0| < bδV , there is no manipulation, i.e.,
X∗1 (X0, α) = S
∗(X0 +X∗1(X0, α), α) = 0.
For |X0| ≥ bδV , however, the informed trader will submit a market order
X∗1 (X0, α) = θsign(X0)(|X0|− bδV ), (12)
and will have recourse to the standing facilities
S∗(X0 +X∗1 (X0, α), α) = −
1 + θ
2
sign(X0)(|X0|− bδV ) (13)
at the end of date 1. Here, θ = δY /(δX − bδV ) > 0 is a measure for the
informational advantage of the informed trader. The swap dealers set the
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competitive rate to
r∗(Z, α) = r0 +
ρ
4
1 + θ
θ
Z. (14)
The probability of manipulation, the extent of manipulation, and the volatility
of the market rate at date 2 are respectively given by
pr{S∗ 6= 0} = δX −
bδV
δX
, (15)
E[|S∗| |S∗ 6= 0] = δX −
bδV + δY
4
, and (16)
σM =
δX − bδV + δY
2δV
s
δX − bδV
3δX
(rL − r0). (17)
Proof. We have to show that conditions (i) and (ii) in the definition of
the equilibrium are satisfied. First, we consider the decision problem of the
informed trader. Let X0 ∈ [−δX ; δX ]. Assume that the swap dealers apply
the linear pricing rule
r∗(X1 + Y ) = r0 + λ(X1 + Y ), (18)
where λ > 0 is a constant. We will show at a later stage of the proof that
λ >
ρ
2
δV
2δV + bδV − δX . (19)
But then, by Lemma A.2 below, the informed trader does not participate in
the swap market for |X0| < bδV , and submits the bid
X∗1(X0, α) =
ρ
4λ− ρ(X0 −
bδV sign(X0)) (20)
for |X0| ≥ bδV . From (20), the distribution of X1, conditional on b = 1, is
uniform on the interval [−δ1; δ1], where
δ1 =
ρ
4λ− ρ(δX −
bδV ) (21)
is the maximum market order of the informed trader. By Theorem 3.1 in
Bagnoli, Viswanathan, and Holden [4], a linear equilibrium requires δY = δ1.
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This proves (12). Solving (21) for λ, and subsequently using (18) proves (14).
Further, inequality (19) is equivalent to
4λ
ρ
= 1 +
δX − bδV
δY
> 1 +
δX − bδV
2δV + bδV − δX
Subtracting one on both sides and invoking (11) shows that (19) is indeed
satisfied. Finally, Lemma A.3 below and (12) deliver (13). Checking the
expressions (15), (16), and (17) is a straightforward exercise. This completes
the proof of Lemma A.1.¶
Lemma A.2. Assume (11) and (19). Then the informed trader does not
participate in the swap market for |X0| < bδV , and submits the bid (20) when-
ever |X0| ≥ bδV .
Proof. When the central bank fine-tunes successfully with probability α,
then the net interest for the informed trader amounts to
π(X0, X1, S, α) (22)
= X0(r(S, α)− r0) +X1(r(S, α)− r∗) + S(r(S, α)− rL/D(S)).
Assuming (18), the expected profit for the informed trader is given by
EY [π] = −λX21 + (X0 +X1 + S)(r(S, α)− r0) + S(r0 − rL/D(S)).
Using Lemma A.3, the informed trader’s objective function is given by
h(X1) = EY [π(X0,X1, S∗(X0 +X1), α)]
=
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
−λX21 if |X| < bδV
−λX21 +
ρ
4
(|X|− bδV )2 if bδV ≤ |X| < bδV + 2δV
−λX21 + ρδV (|X|− δV − bδV ) if |X| ≥ bδV + 2δV .
(23)
From (11) and (19), we obtain 4λ > ρ. Under this condition, the objective
function h(X1) is continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly concave on R. The
necessary and suﬃcient condition for the optimum is therefore h0(X1) = 0.
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Note that the third case |X0+X∗1 | ≥ bδV +2δV is not possible. This is because
in this case the first-order condition would imply |X∗1 | = ρδV /(2λ), but then,
using (19), we obtain |X| ≤ |X0|+ |X∗1 | < bδV +2δV , a contradiction. Assume
now |X0| ≥ bδV . By straightforward extension of Proposition 2, we have
sign(X∗1) = sign(X0) for X0 6= 0. But then clearly |X| < bδV is impossible,
which yields (20). Consider now |X0| < bδV . Formula (20) would imply a
reversed sign for X1, so this is clearly not feasible. Hence X∗1 = 0 in this
case. This proves the assertion.¶
Lemma A.3. In the uniform model with fine-tuning, let bδV = δV /(1−α), as
before. Then S∗(X,α) = 0 for |X| < bδV , while S∗(X,α) = −sign(X)(|X|−bδV )/2 for bδV ≤ |X| < bδV + 2δV , and S∗(X,α) = −sign(X)δV for |X| ≥bδV + 2δV .
Proof. Consider first the case X > 0. Without fine-tuning, Poole’s Lemma
implies r(S) = r0 − S∆/δV for |S| ≤ δV . Using (8) yields r(S, α) = r0 −
S∆/bδV for |S| ≤ δV . Clearly, S∗(X,α) ≤ 0. The necessary first-order
condition for an interior solution reads X = bδV − 2S. Thus, an interior
solution of the informed trader’s problem at the end of date 1 exists and is
given by S∗(X,α) = −(X − bδV )/2 for bδV < X < bδV + 2δV . Otherwise, there
is a boundary solution. From
π(X0, X1,−δV , α)− π(X0,X1, 0, α) = (1− α)(X − 2bδV )∆
it is obvious that S∗(X,α) = 0 for |X| ≤ bδV , and S∗(X,α) = −δV for
X ≥ bδV +2δV . An analogous consideration can be made for the case X < 0.
Hence, the assertion.¶
Proof of Proposition 6. Write r(S, α,∆) for the market rate in a corridor
system with half-width ∆ at date 2 around r0, after a recourse of S, and
with a probability α of successful fine-tuning. Using (8) and Poole’s Lemma
yields
r(S, α,∆) = αr0 + (1− α){ΦV (S)rD2 + (1− ΦV (S))rL2 }
= ΦV (S)(αr0 + (1− α)rD2 ) + (1− ΦV (S))(αr0 + (1− α)rL2 )
= r(S, 0, (1− α)∆).
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Thus, fine-tuning with probability α = 1 − 1/β is equivalent to narrowing
the interest rate corridor on date 2 from ∆1 to ∆2 = (1− α)∆1 = ∆1/β.¶
Proof of Proposition 7. Under the assumptions made, trader i’s objective
function reads
πi(Xi, Si, S−i) = Xi(r(Si + S−i)− r0) + Si(r(Si + S−i)− rL/D(Si)),
where Xi = X i0. Consider first the case X i ≥ 0. Then, for any S−i, choosing
Si > 0 is always (weakly) inferior for trader i than Si = 0 because
πi(X i, Si, S−i)− πi(X i, 0, S−i)
= X i(r(Si + S−i)− r(S−i)| {z }
≤0
) + Si(r(Si + S−i)− rL| {z }
≤0
) ≤ 0.
Thus, Si ≤ 0. Moreover, in the uniform case, choosing Si such that Si+S−i <
−δV is inferior to choosing Si equal to −δV − S−i because
πi(Xi, Si, S−i)− πi(Xi,−δV − S−i, S−i) = (Si + S−i + δV )(rL − rD) < 0.
Thus, if S−i < −δV then an optimal recourse is given by Si,∗(X i, S−i) = 0.
Moreover, if S−i ≥ −δV then Si,∗(Xi, S−i) ∈ J− = [−δV −S−i; 0]. For values
Si ∈ J−, trader i’s objective function is diﬀerentiable and strictly concave
with respect to Si. The interior solution Si,∗(X i, S−i) = (δV −X i − S−i)/2
stays within J− provided that δV − S−i ≤ X i ≤ 3δV + S−i. In a symmetric
equilibrium, S−i = (N − 1)Si. Thus Si,∗(Xi) = (δV − X i)/(N + 1) for
δV ≤ X i ≤ 2 + δV /N , and we have established an equilibrium. The case of
Xi ≤ 0 can be treated in an analogous way.¶
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1
Figure 1. Daily recourses to standing facilities in the Eurosystem, EONIA, and 
key policy rates (24 May - 23 June 2000).
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2Figure 2. Daily recourses to standing facilities in the Eurosystem, EONIA, and 
key policy rates (24 April - 23 May 2003).
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